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cal help, because some of residents left their homes before fire. It may be 
said that the state bodies have no models and the least idea on the forthcom-
ing disaster, its scope, timing, pace, probable character of damages as well as 
on how to cope with it.   
Furthermore, the authorities has no idea what must be done (secured) first of 
all and what  can wait till Spring (Summer, etc). Then it is a problem of neg-
lecting long-term effect of disaster. Rescues returned to their barracks and 
who will plan and implement of people, settlement and nature rehabilitation? 
I share the view of Keen that  not consulting of end-user is a serious prob-
lem. The voice of victims only rare comes through the evaluations made by 
officials. Calling victims or end-users ‘beneficiaries’ tends to pre-empt the 
crucial question or whether they have indeed benefited. 
The next common failing in evaluations of a disaster consequences is that the 
sociologists and rescuers, being outsiders, not asking relevant questions to 
victims of disaster. For example, they were usually never asked about plans 
on their immediate and more distant future. As our investigation showed the 
situation is 50: 50. One half has no plan to resettle, the other dreams to leave 
their settlement for ever. 
I agree with Keen that problems of timing is very acute. Insofar as evalua-
tions are carried out  at the end of the project (whether this is development or 
relief), there will be few opportunities for putting right problems as they 
arise. The temptation is for donors to take minimal responsibility for imple-
mentation a complicated set of rehabilitation measures. Donors prefer simply 
to decide at the end of a rescue operation ‘whether the implementing partners 
performed well or badly. And the final related problem centers on who is 
evaluating whom. Some aid workers have stressed that  a proper evaluation 
should be a “two-way street”: there should be opportunities for recipients to 
evaluate donors as well as the other way round.’ (Keen, 2008: 158-9). Do-
nors and rescue organization welcomed to use resources of local people, but 
never involved them in planning of rescue operations and their evaluations. 
 
9. Conclusions  
 Biophysical ‘events undermine assumptions of safety and mastery of nature’ 
(Murphy, 2010: 15). Nature defined the rescue structure of civil rescuers 
activities and stimulates the emergence of multiple ‘spots’ of activity far 
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beyond the SM’s networks. At the same time, the catastrophe have made 
selection within the environmental and other SMs (active participants, wish-
ful participants and by-standers). 
The catastrophe stimulated the dialogue between scientists and local people 
as well as inside the scientific community. There is no doubt that after the 
above events they are both became more politically oriented. It appears that 
discourse and rhetoric are critically important because they result in particu-
lar practices that are either pro-ecological or harmful in human interaction 
with biophysical dynamics. In particular, how the local population and lead-
ers of rescue teams define particular situation as safe or as risky determines 
the actions that will be taken by civil society activists. Discourse is another 
key component in shaping practices, because winning wrong rhetoric leads 
to disastrous consequences. Discourse analysis focuses on ‘claims-making’ 
by complaining groups. 
 The overall cumulative social effect of this Summer catastrophe ha been the 
recognition that the social order in the country, and of the New Forestry code 
(2005) in particular are harmful both for Russian society and its nature. Be-
sides, the actual behavior of the state organizations responsible for prevent-
ing such catastrophe gave raise to protest and mobilization moods (claims). 
In activation of Russian civil society the IT had played the key role. SM’s 
activists and associated volunteers rendered the assistance in mitigation of 
disaster by the creation of the internet-forums which carried out a multiple 
functions: social (creation of groups which were capable to render material 
and medical help), material, psychological aid, logistics, etc, but science is 
just one of many competing forces in the public arena; 
It should be stressed that though for the first time the evidences of local eye-
witnesses were collected, processed and submitted to the federal govern-
ment, unfortunately with no constructive response up to now, their self-
organization had emerged and extinguish so speedy that sociologists could 
not follow them to fix their activity accurately and in full. Nevertheless, 
these internet-forums allowed to local people to compare information about 
the catastrophe given by the state media with what they have seen as eye-
witnesses. This comparison declined the trust in these media and raise the 
trust to the civil society forums, accounts, reports, etc. 
The participants of the mitigation of the consequences of the catastrophe 
were clearly divided in two parts: those who work in epicenter of it, and 
 118 
 
those who act in a distance. But they were not by-standers and did not avoid 
the participation in rescue operations. On the contrary, they had played the 
important role as the core organizers joining people by means of internet-
forums and blogs, searching various specialists urgently needed in a situ and 
distributing the material aid, garments, medicine, etc. gathered by volunteers 
and ordinary people; Internet and other IT devises became for grassroots a 
powerful means for self-organization. It turned out that internet plus mobile 
phone-set are powerful means for information and self-organization, irres-
pectively to the state command and its intricate and often contradictory in-
structions. Direct communication between civil rescuers and suffering local 
people have begun to rehabilitate the trust between scientists and local 
people, between residents of capital cities and of small towns in province. 
There were a third very small group who consider their participation in dis-
aster mitigation as a kind of extreme tourism or a means of getting an addi-
tional portion of adrenaline.  
 All in all, I call this particular mobilization as ecological because of its inte-
grative and multifunctional character with not definite margins, whereas the 
aid rendered by state’s emergency rescuers has operated in instructive, one-
sided and time-limited way. State rescuers has a definite set of responsibili-
ties and zones defined by their instructions, whereas civil activists felt them-
selves responsible for all related to fire and its victims.  
Summer fires in provinces and Autumn street disturbances of football-fans in 
Moscow finally defined the preferences of power bodies: they like fans and 
dislike environmentalists and defenders of  human rights It is indicative that 
some fun organization called themselves ’Opora’, that means the support of 
existing regime. It turned out that not all dwellers of small towns and large 
cities were infected by individualism and consumerism. Nevertheless, it 
would be wrong to say that civil society organizations are ‘always better’ in 
coping with the disasters than the state ones. ‘For NGOs, accountability is 
often upwards to donors than downwards to beneficiaries. In large part be-
cause of a concern to attract future funding. NGOs and UN agencies typical-
ly put a positive gloss on the impact of their own operations’ (Keen, 2008: 
157).    
In the final analysis, the set of natural disasters in Summer 2010 mobilized 
Russian civil society, made it more stronger and well organized, attracted to 
them more resources as well as backers and sympathizers, and showed to the 
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state officials that in some cases civil organizations were more efficient that 
the state’s rescuers.  
 
